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Children Act 1989 ss.91 + 91A — Effect/duration of orders + s.91(14) anti-vexatious-application restrictions

TL;DR. Section 91 sets out the effect and duration of orders under the Children Act 1989 — including the duration of section-8 orders, the discharge effects between care orders and other orders, and the 6-month delay-on-renewal rule for certain applications. Section 91(14) is the operative anti-vexatious-application restriction: on disposing of any application, the court may order that "no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court". Section 91A (inserted by Domestic Abuse Act 2021 s.67(1), in force 19 May 2022) substantially strengthens the s.91(14) regime: it sets out an explicit risk-of-harm trigger (the s.91(14) order may be made where a further application "would put the child concerned, or another individual ("the relevant individual"), at risk of harm"), permits the court to make s.91(14) orders of its own motion (s.91A(5)(b)), and requires the court to consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances when determining leave applications by a named person. The 2021 amendments were a direct legislative response to documented PA-context and domestic-abuse-context litigation patterns where abusive parents (or the resident parent in PA cases) used repeated applications as an instrument of harassment.

Source: legislation.gov.uk — Crown copyright, Open Government Licence v3.0. · Fetched: 2026-06-14 · Editorial commentary licence: CC BY 4.0

Full statutory text (verbatim)

Section 91 — Effect and duration of orders etc.

(1) The making of a child arrangements order with respect to the living arrangements of a child who is the subject of a care order discharges the care order.

(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a child arrangements order is one made with respect to the living arrangements of a child if the arrangements regulated by the order consist of, or include, arrangements which relate to either or both of the following—

(a) with whom the child is to live, and

(b) when the child is to live with any person.

(2) The making of a care order with respect to a child who is the subject of any section 8 order discharges that order.

(2A) Where an activity direction has been made with respect to a child, the making of a care order with respect to the child discharges the direction.

(3) The making of a care order with respect to a child who is the subject of a supervision order discharges that other order.

(4) The making of a care order with respect to a child who is a ward of court brings that wardship to an end.

(5) The making of a care order with respect to a child who is the subject of a school attendance order made under section 437 of the Education Act 1996 discharges the school attendance order.

(5A) The making of a special guardianship order with respect to a child who is the subject of—

(a) a care order; or

(b) an order under section 34,

discharges that order.

(6) Where an emergency protection order is made with respect to a child who is in care, the care order shall have effect subject to the emergency protection order.

(7) Any order made under section 4(1), 4ZA(1), 4A(1) or 5(1) shall continue in force until the child reaches the age of eighteen, unless it is brought to an end earlier.

(8) Any—

(a) agreement under section 4, 4ZA or 4A; or

(b) appointment under section 5(3) or (4),

shall continue in force until the child reaches the age of eighteen, unless it is brought to an end earlier.

(9) An order under Schedule 1 has effect as specified in that Schedule.

(10) A section 8 order shall, if it would otherwise still be in force, cease to have effect when the child reaches the age of sixteen, unless it is to have effect beyond that age by virtue of section 9(6).

(10A) Subsection (10) does not apply to provision in a child arrangements order which regulates arrangements relating to—

(a) with whom a child is to live, or

(b) when a child is to live with any person.

(11) Where a section 8 order has effect with respect to a child who has reached the age of sixteen, it shall, if it would otherwise still be in force, cease to have effect when he reaches the age of eighteen.

(12) Any care order, other than an interim care order, shall continue in force until the child reaches the age of eighteen, unless it is brought to an end earlier.

(13) Any order made under any other provision of this Act in relation to a child shall, if it would otherwise still be in force, cease to have effect when he reaches the age of eighteen.

(14) On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that "no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court." For further provision about orders under this subsection, see section 91A (section 91(14) orders: further provision).

(15) Where an application ("the previous application") has been made for—

(a) the discharge of a care order;

(b) the discharge of a supervision order;

© the discharge of an education supervision order;

(d) the substitution of a supervision order for a care order; or

(e) a child assessment order,

no further application of a kind mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) may be made with respect to the child concerned, without leave of the court, unless the period between the disposal of the previous application and the making of the further application exceeds six months.

(16) Subsection (15) does not apply to applications made in relation to interim orders.

(17) Where—

(a) a person has made an application for an order under section 34;

(b) the application has been refused; and

© a period of less than six months has elapsed since the refusal,

that person may not make a further application for such an order with respect to the same child, unless he has obtained the leave of the court.

Section 91A — Section 91(14) orders: further provision

(1) This section makes further provision about orders under section 91(14) (referred to in this section as "section 91(14) orders").

(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put—

(a) the child concerned, or

(b) another individual ("the relevant individual"),

at risk of harm.

(3) In the case of a child or other individual who has reached the age of eighteen, the reference in subsection (2) to "harm" is to be read as a reference to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.

(4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made.

(5) A section 91(14) order may be made by the court—

(a) on an application made—

**(i)** by the relevant individual;

**(ii)** by or on behalf of the child concerned;

**(iii)** by any other person who is a party to the application being disposed of by the court;

(b) of its own motion.

(6) In this section, "the child concerned" means the child referred to in section 91(14).

Why ss.91 + 91A matter for parental-alienation analysis

Section 91(14) — the "barring order"

Section 91(14) "barring orders" are one of the most operationally significant statutory tools in two distinct PA-context patterns — and the tool is symmetrical, meaning the same statutory provision can be deployed by either side.

Pattern 1 — Anti-vexatious deployment AGAINST repeated obstructive applications: Where one parent uses repeat applications as an instrument of harassment or to perpetuate disruption of the child's life, the target parent may seek a s.91(14) order requiring the applicant to obtain leave before making further specified applications. The leading authority on the original (pre-2022) regime is Re P (Section 91(14) Guidelines) [1999] 2 FLR 573 (Court of Appeal), setting out the guidelines for when the discretion should be exercised — historically requiring "exceptional circumstances" or evidence that the applicant's litigation conduct was oppressive.

Pattern 2 — Anti-vexatious deployment AGAINST repeated PA-context applications: Where an alienating parent uses repeat applications to disrupt the established arrangement or to extract further restrictions on the target parent's contact, a s.91(14) order requiring leave can stabilise the arrangement and protect the child from the litigation cycle.

The pre-2022 Re P guidelines treated s.91(14) orders as a draconian remedy requiring exceptional circumstances. The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 s.67(1) insertion of section 91A substantially relaxed this — see below.

Section 91A — the 2021 reform (in force 19 May 2022)

Section 91A was inserted in direct response to two strands of advocacy: (i) the Domestic Abuse Commissioner's evidence on how family-court applications were being used by perpetrators of domestic abuse as a continuation of coercive control; and (ii) the Court of Appeal's 2021 Re-arc decisions on the same theme (Re H-N and Others [2021] EWCA Civ 448). The new section:

  • Explicit risk-of-harm trigger — s.91A(2): the court may make a s.91(14) order where it is satisfied that a further application "would put the child concerned, or another individual ("the relevant individual"), at risk of harm." "Harm" includes physical and mental harm, and (per s.91A(3)) for adults includes "ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health." This is the canonical statutory hook for protecting the target parent and the child from continued litigation-as-harassment.

  • Court may act of its own motion — s.91A(5)(b): the court no longer requires an application from a party to make a s.91(14) order. This means the court can act protectively where it identifies a pattern of vexatious or harassing litigation conduct without the target parent or the child's representative having to formally apply.

  • Material-change-of-circumstances test on leave applications — s.91A(4): where a named person applies for leave to make a further specified application, the court must consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances. This significantly raises the bar for circumventing a s.91(14) order — the named person must demonstrate that material circumstances have changed since the order was made, not merely that they wish to re-litigate the same issues.

Practice points (PA-context)

  • A target parent in a sustained PA case may apply for a s.91(14) order against the alienating parent to prevent repeat applications seeking further restrictions on contact, where each prior application has failed.

  • An alienating parent may attempt to use s.91(14) against the target parent — alleging that the target parent's enforcement applications are themselves vexatious. PA-aware practice resists this framing: applications to enforce contact orders against documented obstruction are not vexatious; they are necessary.

  • The 2022 reforms (s.91A) substantially expand the court's protective toolkit — the s.91(14) order is now available much more readily where a "risk of harm" can be identified, including the cumulative harm of being subjected to repeat litigation in PA-context cases.

Practice Direction 12J + Re H-N alignment

Section 91A operates alongside Practice Direction 12J (Family Procedure Rules) — the fact-finding framework for domestic abuse and PA-context allegations — and the post-Re H-N Court of Appeal framework. The three together form the protective architecture for the family court's handling of high-conflict cases.

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