Children Act 1989 section 11 — General principles and supplementary provisions¶
TL;DR. Section 11 is the timetabling + general-principles + interim-orders statute for section 8 proceedings in England and Wales. Subsection (1) is the operationally critical no-delay principle in action — courts must "draw up a timetable with a view to determining the question without delay" and give directions to ensure adherence. Subsection (3) permits interim section 8 orders at any time during proceedings. Subsections (5)-(6) automatically discharge child arrangements orders where the parents resume cohabitation for more than six months. Subsection (7) is the procedural toolkit — section 8 orders may contain directions, conditions on named persons, time limits, and consequential provisions. PA-context cases routinely engage s.11(1) (timetabling to address sustained alienating conduct), s.11(3) (urgent interim CAOs), and s.11(7) (conditional CAOs imposing specific contact-facilitation requirements on the obstructing parent).
Source: legislation.gov.uk — Crown copyright, Open Government Licence v3.0. · Fetched: 2026-06-13 · Editorial commentary licence: CC BY 4.0
Full statutory text (verbatim)¶
11 General principles and supplementary provisions.¶
(1) In proceedings in which any question of making a section 8 order, or any other question with respect to such an order, arises, the court shall (in the light of any provision in rules of court that is of the kind mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b))—
(a) draw up a timetable with a view to determining the question without delay; and
(b) give such directions as it considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that that timetable is adhered to.
(2) Rules of court may—
(a) specify periods within which specified steps must be taken in relation to proceedings in which such questions arise; and
(b) make other provision with respect to such proceedings for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that such questions are determined without delay.
(3) Where a court has power to make a section 8 order, it may do so at any time during the course of the proceedings in question even though it is not in a position to dispose finally of those proceedings.
(4) [Subsection (4) repealed.]
(5) Where—
(a) a child arrangements order has been made with respect to a child; and
(b) the child has two parents who each have parental responsibility for him,
the order, so far as it has the result that there are times when the child lives or is to live with one of the parents, shall cease to have effect if the parents live together for a continuous period of more than six months.
(6) A child arrangements order made with respect to a child, so far as it provides for the child to spend time or otherwise have contact with one of the child's parents at times when the child is living with the child's other parent, shall cease to have effect if the parents live together for a continuous period of more than six months.
(7) A section 8 order may—
(a) contain directions about how it is to be carried into effect;
(b) impose conditions which must be complied with by any person—
**(i)** who is named in the order as a person with whom the child concerned is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact;
**(ii)** who is a parent of the child;
**(iii)** who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him; or
**(iv)** with whom the child is living,
and to whom the conditions are expressed to apply;
© be made to have effect for a specified period, or contain provisions which are to have effect for a specified period;
(d) make such incidental, supplemental or consequential provision as the court thinks fit.
Why section 11 matters for parental-alienation analysis¶
Section 11 supplies the operational procedural framework within which section 8 orders are made and enforced. Three subsections are particularly PA-relevant:
-
Subsection (1) — no-delay principle operationalised: section 11(1) is the implementation of the section 1(2) general principle that "any delay in determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child." The Court of Appeal in Re B (A Child) and the Family Justice Review (2011) repeatedly emphasised the cumulative welfare cost of delay in family-law proceedings. In PA-context cases this principle is doubly acute: every month of unaddressed obstruction entrenches the child's distorted view of the target parent, making intervention progressively harder. The 26-week public-law case duration target (CFA 2014 s.14) and the comparable private-law expectation operationalise this principle.
-
Subsection (3) — interim section 8 orders: the court may make a CAO, PSO, or SIO at any time during proceedings without disposing finally. This is the canonical procedural hook for interim relief in PA-context cases — e.g., interim CAOs preserving contact pending fact-finding, interim PSOs preventing one parent from changing the child's school or removing the child from the jurisdiction. Where allegations of PA-pattern conduct are made, the court has the s.11(3) power to put in place protective interim arrangements without waiting for the substantive determination.
-
Subsection (7) — conditional CAOs: the most operationally powerful PA-context tool. Section 11(7)(b) permits the court to impose conditions on named persons including the parent named as "person with whom the child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact." Conditions can require: handover protocols (place, time, witnesses); attendance at therapeutic intervention (e.g., family-based PA-intervention programmes); restrictions on the parent's communications with the child about the litigation; restrictions on third-party exposure during contact. Section 11(7) conditions are the typical mechanism through which PA-aware Cafcass section 7 reports translate into enforceable order terms.
Section 11(5)-(6) automatic-discharge rules are operationally important: if parents resume cohabitation for more than six months, the live-with and contact provisions of a CAO automatically cease to have effect. This rule prevents historic CAOs from constraining post-reconciliation arrangements but creates a litigation risk if reconciliation later breaks down (the parents must re-apply for a fresh CAO).
Cross-references within the AntiAlienate Knowledge Base¶
- Companion statutes: Children Act 1989 section 1 (welfare paramountcy + welfare checklist) · Children Act 1989 section 8 (orders toolkit)
- Enforcement framework: Children Act 1989 ss.11A-11P (enforcement orders for breach of CAOs); Family Procedure Rules 2010
- Procedural anchor: Children and Families Act 2014 (CFA 2014) — introduced child arrangements orders and the 26-week case-duration framework
- Re-arc case-law line: Re A [2019] EWCA Civ 1735 → Re S [2020] EWCA Civ 568 → Re H-N [2021] EWCA Civ 448 → Re C [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam)
- ECHR anchor: ECHR Article 8 (positive-obligations doctrine — courts must act expeditiously)
- Jurisdiction page: England and Wales
Primary source¶
- legislation.gov.uk canonical URL: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41/section/11
- Statute citation: Children Act 1989 (1989 c.41), section 11 (as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 to update terminology for "child arrangements orders" — replacing prior "residence orders" and "contact orders" terminology in subsections (5)-(7))
- Status: Crown copyright; published under the Open Government Licence v3.0 — verbatim reproduction permitted.
Sources & authoritative references¶
Referenced in this page:
Topic baseline (independently verifiable):
- HUDOC — European Court of Human Rights
- BAILII — UK / Ireland case law
- CanLII — Canadian case law
- AustLII — Australian case law
- Justia — US case law
- Cornell LII — US legal research
- CJEU CURIA — EU Court of Justice