Skip to content

Children Act 1989, Section 91A — Section 91(14) Orders: Further Provision

Jurisdiction: England & Wales · Citation: Children Act 1989 (c. 41), section 91A · Authoritative source: legislation.gov.uk — s.91A

Inserted by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (in force 28 February 2022) to operationalise and broaden the s.91(14) barring-order regime. The provision was prompted by concern that courts had been historically reluctant to use s.91(14) even where vexatious-litigation patterns were clear in domestic-abuse and PA cases. s.91A explicitly recognises risk of harm to the child OR another individual as a basis for the barring order — a critical expansion for parental-alienation contexts where the targeted parent is the one being weaponised through litigation.

Verbatim text (current consolidated)

91A Section 91(14) orders: further provision.

(1) This section makes further provision about orders under section 91(14) (referred to in this section as "section 91(14) orders").

(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14) order include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an order under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14) order would put—

(a) the child concerned, or

(b) another individual ("the relevant individual"),

at risk of harm.

(3) In the case of a child or other individual who has reached the age of eighteen, the reference in subsection (2) to "harm" is to be read as a reference to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.

(4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14) order applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the order was made.

(5) A section 91(14) order may be made by the court—

(a) on an application made—

(i) by the relevant individual;

(ii) by or on behalf of the child concerned;

(iii) by any other person who is a party to the application being disposed of by the court;

(b) of its own motion.

(6) In this section, "the child concerned" means the child referred to in section 91(14).

Why this matters for PA

  • s.91A(2)(b) — "another individual" is the critical expansion: a s.91(14) barring order can now protect the targeted parent (not only the child) where the alienating parent's pattern of applications would put that parent at risk of harm. Pre-2022, s.91(14) was construed narrowly as a child-protection power; s.91A explicitly extends it.
  • Adult harm (s.91A(3)) is defined as "ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health" — broad enough to capture the psychological harm of vexatious litigation against an alienated parent.
  • s.91A(4) "material change of circumstances" is the leave threshold — the alienating parent cannot apply for leave just because they want to litigate again; they must show genuine new circumstances. This raises the bar against repeat applications.
  • s.91A(5)(b) "of its own motion" — the court can make a barring order without an application, addressing the historical reluctance that targeted parents had to themselves apply (often re-traumatising) for protection from vexatious litigation.
  • [President's Guidance: s.91(14) orders] (2022) — Sir Andrew McFarlane P issued formal guidance after the s.91A amendment to encourage broader use, explicitly noting that the previous practice of treating s.91(14) as an "exceptional" remedy had been incorrect.
  • 2024 Family Justice Council guidance on alienating behaviours explicitly endorses s.91(14)/91A as a primary procedural response in PA cases where one parent's repeated applications form part of the alienating pattern.

Sources & authoritative references

Referenced in this page:

Topic baseline (independently verifiable):